Northshore Safety Services provides independent operational reviews of permit-to-work systems in high-hazard industrial environments.
The work is led by Jordan Larne, a specialist in control of work systems with over a decade of frontline experience across top-tier COMAH-regulated manufacturing, utilities operations, and global industrial EHS.
Operational Background
That experience is grounded in ten years at a top-tier COMAH-regulated pharmaceutical manufacturing site operating multiple process plants, hazardous chemical systems, steam and utilities infrastructure, fermentation facilities, and a CHP plant — with permit activity running across all of them simultaneously.
During that time Jordan worked across the full permit lifecycle: issuing permits across all work categories at volume, acting as site SME for all permit-related activity, and supporting major projects including new plant builds, commissioning, and decommissioning. Later roles in operations management and utilities management brought direct experience of the pressure that production timelines and operational complexity place on permit systems — seen from the management side as well as the permit desk.
That combination – high-volume issuing experience, project and shutdown management, ALARP assessment, and operational management accountability – gives a view of how permit systems behave under the full range of conditions they actually face.
Jordan now works within a global EHS function supporting high-hazard industrial operations across multiple territories, with experience extending into incident management and operational safety training.
Northshore operates independently of that role, providing fixed-scope reviews for organisation’s that want an honest operational assessment of their permit system.
Where the Practical Knowledge Came From
The following are real operational situations encountered during permit issuing and area management. They are included here because they illustrate more clearly than any service description what this kind of review experience actually looks like.
When the paperwork said safe and the atmosphere did not
A cleaning crew was preparing to work on the external surfaces of a blender. The permit process had been followed. There was no obvious external sign of danger. Management pressure to progress the job was present throughout.
During the walkdown before issuing, the smell coming from the blender indicated something that did not match the assumption that conditions were acceptable. Atmosphere testing at the hatches showed oxygen levels below a safe working limit.
The job was stopped. An extraction system was installed. Atmosphere levels were monitored until safe conditions were confirmed. Work then proceeded with each operative wearing personal oxygen monitors throughout.
Nothing in the permit documentation would have caught that. The walkdown caught it. The decision to test rather than proceed caught it. That is the difference between a system that controls work and a system that records it.
When the isolation was signed off but the energy was still present
A technician was preparing to work on a flocculant system. Electrical power had been successfully locked out. The LOTO checklist had a signature confirming that lines had been drained and flushed. They had not been.
When a triclamp was loosened to test a flowmeter, residual trapped pressure sent a blank shooting off the fitting. The technician was covered in flocculant. A near-miss to the face, an immediate environmental hazard, and a system that had passed every documentary check.
The investigation identified the gap between what was recorded and what had physically been done. It led directly to the introduction of pre-approved isolation blocks: isolations designed in advance with expert process safety input, drain valves specified as locked open and documented, sheets paired with the maintenance work ticket to manage the full strip and rebuild sequence. The system stopped relying on in-the-moment decisions made under operational pressure.
When two legitimate activities created a hazard neither of them owned
A cleaning crew was working on a bung adjacent to a caustic storage tank. A caustic offload was scheduled in the same area. Neither activity had visibility of the other. During the transfer, pressurised pipework failed. Caustic sprayed across the work area. The crew were narrowly missed.
No procedure had been violated in isolation. The offload was authorised. The cleaning work was authorised. The gap was coordination — and the hazard existed entirely in the interaction between the two activities, not in either one alone.
Managing the response as area manager, coordinating the repair, and implementing permanent controls led to a site notification system with a physical key release mechanism: the offload key could not be released until all notification signatures were in place and all personnel in the affected area were accounted for.
That kind of incident does not appear in a permit audit. Both permits were issued correctly. The failure was the absence of any mechanism to make one activity aware of the other.
What This Means for a Review
These situations share a common pattern. The documentation was present. The signatures were in place. The system appeared controlled. The gap in each case was between what the paperwork recorded and what was physically happening – or about to happen – on the ground.
That gap is what an operational review examines. Not whether procedures exist, but whether the system maintains control when the site is busy, the pressure is real, and the pace is high.
Most permit systems are reviewed through compliance audits and internal inspections. Those processes confirm that documentation is present. An independent operational review starts from a different question: how does this system actually behave when it is under load?
Request a Review
Organisation’s seeking an independent review of their permit-to-work system can request further information from Northshore Safety Services.